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Executive Summary and Key Recommendations 
 
In June 2017, on the tenth anniversary of the first Central Asia Strategy, the Council of the European 
Union invited High Representative Federica Mogherini and the European Commission (EC) to draw a 
proposal for a new Strategy by late 2019. The Council's decision provides a pivotal opportunity to 
review the significant shortcomings of the previous Strategy and to assess the evolving regional 
environment, in which Russia and China have consolidated their influence.  
By presenting four possible strategies for future EU engagement, this policy brief argues that rather 
than increasing or reducing ‘hard’ commitments or keeping the same agenda, the new Strategy should 
enhance EU cultural diplomacy in the region. In line with the increased emphasis on the role of culture 
in European external action, EU cultural diplomacy should meet local citizenry’s aspirations and 
demands, and give Brussels a comparative advantage over other regional powers. 
To bring positive change, a number of recommendations are proposed: 
Ø As a kick-off event, the EU should organise a high-level meeting with EU and Central Asian 
Ministers of Culture, similarly to what the Latvian Presidency of the EU Council did in June 
2015, when Riga hosted the first meeting of European and Central Asian Ministers of 
Education. 
Ø High-level meetings should be coupled with regional and national events for cultural operators, 
with at least two objectives: reaching out local stakeholders, and tailoring an approach to their 
needs. 
Ø Financial support to local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) operating in the field of culture 
should be provided both at bilateral and regional levels. Where EUNIC clusters are present 
(Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), they could serve as implementing partners in consortia 
recognising and involving local actors as crucial agents. Where they are missing, emphasis on 
EU member states’ (EU MS) institutes should be added.  
Ø Creating an EU national delegation in Turkmenistan should be indicated as a critical objective 
of the new Strategy, also for cultural cooperation.  
Ø At the educational level, the EU should provide increased support to the participation of Central 
Asia’s higher education institutions (HEIs) in the Erasmus+ programme. 
Ø In line with other experts’ views, an initiative on technical education, focusing for instance on 
oil and gas technology and IT sectors should be promoted and led by those EU MS that are 
more engaged in regional cooperation (i.e. Germany and Latvia). 
Ø Finally, the new Strategy should provide clear indicators against which EU policy-makers and 
relevant stakeholders could review the proposed policies. This should include the creation of 
EU-funded barometers, analysing perceptions of EU broader policies in the region, and EU 
cultural action in particular. 
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1. Yesterday. The Strategy for a New Partnership: achievements and shortcomings 
Long perceived as a terra incognito in Brussels, Central Asia grew in importance after 9/11 and the 
Western intervention in Afghanistan, when its closeness to the theatre of operations raised some 
security concerns. In 2007, under an initiative of the German Presidency of the EU, the Council adopted 
the ‘Strategy for a New Partnership for Central Asia’. As the first-ever comprehensive approach to the 
region, it identified seven priorities: aside from ‘harder’ engagements on trade, border management, 
energy, and transport, it also mentioned human rights, education, and inter-cultural dialogue. 
Throughout the four reviews, the regional approach has been progressively balanced by a stronger 
bilateral dimension. In the 2012 Progress Report, the focus on security was increased by introducing, 
among others, a regular High-Level Security Dialogue. At the same time, the report downgraded other 
priorities such as energy and inter-cultural dialogue, with the latter receiving close-to-zero attention 
in the document. In the new cycle 2014-2020, bilateral funds have been allocated to four out of the 
five countries, with Kazakhstan receiving funding only within the framework of regional activities. 
Despite the emphasis put on official documents, Central Asian education has received mixed 
attention over the past years. The 2012 Progress Report provided very general action points, 
supporting among others vocational training reforms and promoting cooperation between EU and 
regional research institutions. To enhance dialogue, between January and July 2015, the Latvian EU 
Presidency engaged in the fourth review process of the Strategy and organised some high-level 
events. In this regard, Riga hosted the first meeting of EU and Central Asian Ministers for Education 
in June 2015. Bilateral educational initiatives have targeted only three out of five countries: 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.  
Overall, eleven years after its adoption, pro and cons of the Strategy are clear. On the one hand, the 
document allowed the EU for the first time to delineate its primary interests in the region and to create 
some institutional mechanisms to enhance relations at both regional and bilateral levels. Similarly, 
the strategy offered Central Asian countries a window to Europe, leading political elites to get first-
hand knowledge of EU institutional mechanisms. Within this framework, the EU managed to establish 
delegations in four out of five countries, Turkmenistan being at present the exception. 
If the achievements of the Strategy are evident, so are the shortcomings, and the major one seems to 
be the existence of an overwhelming gap between the objectives outlined in the document and the 
resources allocated in the two cycles. This resources-objectives gap, so to speak, was coupled with 
the absence of a detailed action plan simplifying the review process and of clear benchmarks against 
which EU policies could be assessed. In particular, while mentioned as a critical priority, the cultural 
dimension was never explored throughout the eleven years of implementation of the Strategy, and the 
overall impression was that ‘culture’ was just an appealing and zero-cost catchword in the document. 
 
2. Today. A Changed Political Environment and Competing Regional Powers 
In June 2017, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Strategy, the Council invited the High 
Representative and the EC to circulate a proposal for a new Strategy by the end of 2019. After more 
than a decade, this course for a renewed document provides a significant opportunity to all European 
and regional actors that have been involved in various ways in the design and implementation of the 
previous Strategy. Together with the achievements and the shortcomings discussed in the last 
section, a serious review process should also take into account both the domestic trajectories of 
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Central Asian countries, and the changed role of the major external actors in the region, namely Russia, 
China, and the United States (US). 
Internal and regional challenges: between new leadership and constitutional changes 
In general terms, EU visibility in the region has decreased over the past years. Elites have gradually 
reinforced political control over the population, and Central Asian authoritarian path has clashed with 
the EU’s value-driven agenda1. On top of that, both the financial crisis and the instability in the 
European Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods contributed to the feeling that EU MS would pay 
more attention to the domestic situation and their closer borders, and so neglect ‘the neighbours of 
the neighbours’. Against this background, some major domestic developments have taken place.  
Firstly, after the 2010 Revolution, and the ethnic tensions involving Kyrgyz people and the Uzbek 
minority, Kyrgyzstan has worked to enhance its parliamentary democracy. As a response, Russia has 
worked to tighten control over the country’s domestic and foreign policies by adopting a number of 
measures, including Rosneft’s and Gazprom's investments in energy projects. Today, Kyrgyzstan 
remains both the EU's and Russia's most crucial aid recipient country in the region. 
Secondly, 2016 marked a new opportunity for cooperation between Uzbekistan and both the EU and 
Central Asian states. Following the death of Islam Karimov, the new elected President Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev has abandoned the long-established isolationist path and promoted good relations with 
neighbours. One could refer, for instance, to the recent consultative meeting held in Astana on 15 
March, gathering the Heads of Central Asian states. During the opening speech, Kazakhstan’s 
President Nazarbayev acknowledged Mirziyoyev’s input to hold regular working consultations and 
solve regional problems in a coordinated framework2. Recent developments were also welcomed by 
High Representative Mogherini, highlighting progress on borders delimitation, economic cooperation, 
and remarking “an overall improvement in terms of working with partners in the region”3. 
Finally, recent constitutional changes in Kazakhstan should not be neglected. Under Nazarbayev’s 
initiative, a reform was approved to enact some changes in the distribution of powers between the 
Presidency and a number of different players, including the Government and the Parliament. While the 
President remains the key actor indicating the major domestic and foreign policy objectives, these 
changes increase the government's role in policy implementation and provide new checks and 
balances. 
Russia, China, and the US: competing actors with different goals 
Eleven years after the adoption of the European Strategy, and following Brussels’s decline in visibility, 
have major regional powers deepened their presence in the region? As a whole, it appears that Russia’s 
and China’s efforts have been successful in this. Moscow remains today the key foreign actor in 
Central Asia as a result of a strategy relying heavily on the Russian diaspora and combining hard and 
soft tools. At the military level, most of the Central Asian states have kept ‘bandwagoning’ with Russia 
                                                            
 
1 See HUG, A. (Ed.), Sharing Worst Practice. How countries and institutions in the former Soviet Union helped create legal tools 
of repression. Foreign Policy Centre, May 2016. https://fpc.org.uk/publications/sharingworstpractice/ Retrieved on 13 April 
2018. 
2 KAZINFORM, Leaders of Central Asian countries meet in Astana, 15 March 2018. https://www.inform.kz/en/leaders-of-central-
asian-countries-meet-in-astana_a3185658 Retrieved on 4 April 2018. 
3 DAVLETOVA, N., Mogherini: Recent developments in Central Asia open new perspectives for EU’s cooperation with it, Astana 
Times, 9 November 2017. https://astanatimes.com/2017/11/mogherini-recent-developments-in-central-asia-open-new-
perspectives-for-eus-cooperation-with-it/ Retrieved on 4 April 2018. 
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in security structures such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO)4. This only partially applies to Uzbekistan, which withdrew for a 
second time from CSTO in 2012, while Turkmenistan has so far refused any prospect of regional 
integration with or without Russia.  
Aside from military might, Moscow has also promoted its ‘Eurasian way’ through trade and soft power 
tools. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are today full members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 
while Tajikistan is considered a prospect member. Emphasis on the EAEU should also be seen as part 
of a broader soft action in the region. In the past years, Moscow has in fact restructured its 
developments assistance, increased its bilateral financial aid in the region, and created a number of 
public, mixed, and private agencies working on cultural diplomacy. Favoured by territorial contiguity 
and the prominence of the Russian language and media in the region, Moscow’s culture and education 
remain highly attractive among the general populations and the political elites.  
While Russia remains key in the region, overemphasis on its influence should be avoided for a number 
of reasons. As a first point, Moscow’s achievements have been fragmented, depending on the country 
and the targeted sector. For instance, at both security and economic levels, Russia failed to secure 
solid partnerships with all Central Asian states. Perhaps most importantly, even in consistently 
Russophile countries (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), political elites have become less accommodating 
with the Kremlin and promoted when possible balanced exercises with other regional powers, 
including the EU. 
Together with Russia, China occupies a very high position in Central Asian states’ agenda. In the last 
decade, Beijing’s engagement has covered an increasing number of sectors, ranging from trade and 
energy to multilateral cooperation at the security level within SCO’s framework. Following Central 
Asia’s position at the heart of the continent, it is not surprising that the success of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will also depend on the positive 
involvement of the ‘five countries. As such, it has been argued that the region is a test for Beijing: 
integrating poorer countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are heavily dependent on aid 
and foreign investment, could eventually lead to the creation of “a new kind of international order in 
which China plays a leading role”5.  
Chinese regional engagement is not without risk. Scepticism around Beijing’s interest arose clearly in 
May 2016 when in Kazakhstan, talks on changes of the land code to attract Chinese investors led to 
the most significant dissent movement in recent years. The episode also allowed protesters to voice 
environmental concerns on Chinese presence of polluting industries in the country. Distrust does not 
only concern trade presence but also people-to-people initiatives, which China has been developing 
over the past years. Despite increased efforts, China’s cultural attractiveness remains lower when 
compared to that of Russia or EU MS. 
As for the US, regional engagement has changed in the past years. The withdrawal of troops from 
Afghanistan has reduced Washington’s logistical needs to support military activities. This also came 
at a time of more pressing geopolitical priorities across the world, ranging from the Ukraine crisis and 
Russia's unexpected re-assertiveness to the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. 
                                                            
 
4 For a more detailed analysis, see VALENZA D. and BOERS. E., Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU’s and Russia’s Cultural 
Diplomacy towards Central Asia. United Nations University on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS). EL-CSID 
Working-Paper. 18(9), 2018. http://cris.unu.edu/assessing-effectiveness-eus-and-russias-cultural-diplomacy-towards-central-
asia Retrieved on 8 April 2018. 
5 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Central Asia’s Silk Road Rivalries, Report n° 245, 27 July 2017. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/245-central-asias-silk-road-rivalries Retrieve on 8 April 2018. 
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Furthermore, it should not be neglected that, although since the collapse of the Soviet Union part of 
US strategy in Central Asia has focused on democracy promotion, Washington’s security needs have 
been finally prioritised. Perhaps the most striking example of this is offered by the agenda of the C5+1, 
a platform for dialogue and cooperation established in 2015 by the US and the five Central Asian 
States to complement bilateral relations. In the first ministerial meeting held in Samarkand in 
November 2015, the three areas of cooperation designed included security, trade, and environment, 
with no mention of the rule of law, human rights, or people-to-people contacts. Contrary to Russia and 
China, which have tried to work on culture (even with contrasting results), the US has de facto 
withdrawn from this field. 
 
3. Tomorrow: EU cultural strategy for Central Asia 
If one tries to summarise the main findings from the regional scenario, it appears clear that the past 
decade witnessed Russia’s and China’s consolidation in Central Asia, with Moscow focusing on 
security and softer measures, and Beijing rising to a position without equal when it comes to trade 
and energy. Also, western political influence and democracy-based agenda appear to be severely 
downsized, with the US focusing on harder matters. Under the following scenario, it seems that the 
EU could pursue four main strategies to review its current plans on Central Asia.  
Strategy A. ‘Retreating’ 
In this approach, the EU would decide to reduce its engagement in the region drastically. With 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan classified as upper middle-income countries according to World Bank 
classification, Brussels could narrow its focus on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which depend 
significantly on Western bilateral aid. Based on their modest results, initiatives on Rule of Law and 
Education would be removed from the future strategy. 
In pursuing this strategy, the EU would end the resources-objectives gap by reducing the latter. Also, 
this would acknowledge a basic fact: Brussels is not a principal geopolitical actor in the region, and it 
is not destined to rise and compete with Russia and China in the long run. Such a shift would also 
give the opportunity to increase the focus on the closer neighbourhoods, where instability and crisis-
management have become the rule rather than the exception. 
While a ‘retreating’ option could suit some needs at the EU level, it is maybe the least appropriate 
approach to target Central Asia. In spite of some general improvements, Central Asia remains insecure 
and problematic, with risks of terrorism and other forms of violence, which could be home-produced or 
stemming from neighbours such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Also, uncooperative postures of 
political elites cannot help but deteriorate the already delicate regional environment. Given that 
retaining a role in Central Asia would ultimately be in Brussels’s core interests, other options should 
be envisaged. 
Strategy B. ‘Keeping’ (things as they are) 
In the light of Central Asia’s strategic significance, the EU could be better advised by keeping the 
holistic approach of the 2007 Strategy and combining hard and soft priorities. As such, the new 
document would be a review rather than a revision, perhaps with a new balance between regional and 
bilateral engagement, based on Uzbekistan's renewed multilateral engagement. The Strategy would 
reaffirm the role of dialogue with Central Asian countries and stress the success of the format of 
cooperation of the last decade. 
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If keeping things as they are would better serve EU interests rather than the retreating option, it would 
also lack foresight. The shortcomings of the 2007 Strategy explained in this brief require a clear re-
orientation at the EU level and in particular, a simplified strategy demonstrating to its regional 
stakeholders that the EU is willing to close the gap between objectives and resources.  
Strategy C. ‘Hardening’  
To seek a concrete policy impact, the EU could follow Washington's example and come up with a 
renovated interest-driven agenda. This would include priorities in the areas of security and stability, 
trade, and energy, with a combined bilateral and multilateral approach. In principle, as emphasised in 
the 2017 Council Conclusions, Brussels would target enhanced cooperation on border management 
and the extension of the Southern Gas Corridor. Other points of the future agenda could be defined in 
collaboration with Central Asian countries, which might welcome the reduced focus on democracy 
promotion and human rights. Following the path of the last decade, the intercultural dialogue would 
be virtually or practically removed from the priorities of the new Strategy. 
There is no doubt that in such a scenario, the EU and Central Asian elites may speak the same 
language. Scepticism of Brussels's too broad and badly-defined agenda would wane, and the EU 
would become part of those interest-oriented regional actors that seem to have a more strategic long-
term vision: China, Russia, and the US. If it is true that the EU should narrow its focus and better define 
its priorities, playing a great-power game would be a step in a minefield for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, contrary to Russia and China, Brussels lacks leverage: Moscow has a well-defined security role 
and retains control over media infrastructure, while Beijing is the key trade actor. Secondly, Brussels 
is not a major geopolitical player and should not develop ambitions to become one, also to avoid great-
power competitions and regional tensions. Where possible, the EU should instead favour cooperation 
with other regional powers and design a more unpretentious and discreet way to engage Central Asia. 
Strategy D. ‘Softening’ 
Finally, among EU options in Central Asia, this brief argues that one could provide a significant added 
value and genuinely renew the approach to the region. Rather than increasing or reducing hard 
engagements, or going down the same route, a new direction should enhance EU cultural diplomacy. 
Such a choice would be in line with other broader policy declarations, such as the 2017 
Communication 'Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations', advancing cultural 
cooperation with third countries and mainstreaming culture in European external action. At least at 
the discursive level, the Strategy aims to signal that EU MS are ready to combine cultural efforts 
abroad. 
Based on these developments, the EC, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the European 
Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC) have agreed on a number of arrangements for future 
activities. The document signed by these actors in May 2017 promotes a cross-cutting approach to 
culture, which embraces a “wide and inclusive range of policies and activities”6, ranging from arts and 
literature to inter-cultural dialogue, research, and education. A reinforced engagement on culture in 
Central Asia would also be in line with EUNIC’s strategic framework for 2025, planning to make the 
network a key partner for EU cultural diplomacy. As a strategic objective, the framework aims to 
                                                            
 
6 EEAS, EUNIC & EC, Administrative arrangement for activities to be developed by the European Union National Institutes for Culture 
(EUNIC) in partnership with the European Commission Services and the European External Action Service jointly referred to hereinafter 
as “the two Sides”, 16 May 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16_admin_arrangement_eunic.pdf Retrieved 
on 4 April 2018.  
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enhance clusters’ capacities to design and implements cultural projects both within and outside the 
EU. At present, Central Asia hosts two clusters in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and Tashkent, Uzbekistan.  
There are at least two solid reasons why investing in cultural diplomacy in Central Asia would be a 
success. Firstly, EU MS cultural attractiveness in the region is doubtless. Data from EDB Integration 
Barometers prepared by the Eurasian Development Bank’s Centre for Integration Studies and the 
Eurasian Monitor reveal that, while Russia remains the major ‘soft’ actor in the region, EU MS cultures 
are significantly attractive in Central Asia and especially in those countries that show a stronger 
degree of openness (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan)7. European culture and education opportunities are 
part of Central Asian citizens’ aspirations and generate a demand that the future Strategy should 
meet. Secondly, European cultural expertise gives Brussels a comparative advantage, allowing the EU to 
distinguish itself from the other regional powers. In the long run, one could not exclude that, in a 
functionalist vision, enhanced and successful cultural cooperation may lead to a more structured 
dialogue in other harder spheres. 
To bring positive change in the cultural sphere, this brief recommends a number of measures. As a 
first point, and as a kick-off event of the New Strategy, a high-level meeting between EU and Central 
Asian Ministers of Culture should take place, similarly to what Latvian EU Presidency did in June 2015, 
when Riga hosted the first meeting of the 28+5 Ministers of Education. As a complement and to 
strengthen ties between European and Central Asian cultural operators, high-level events should be 
coupled with regional and bilateral initiatives with at least two objectives: reaching out local 
stakeholders and tailoring an approach to their needs. For instance, in Kazakhstan, increased attention 
should be paid to the work of European ethno-cultural centres, which could facilitate cultural 
exchanges through their ties to the government and both 'homeland' and 'host land' communities8. 
In the light of increased support to cultural actors, the new Strategy should strengthen funding to local 
CSOs operating in the field at both bilateral and regional levels. Where EUNIC clusters are established, 
their collaboration with European delegations should be promoted. Clusters could thus operate as 
implementing partners in consortia recognising and involving local actors as key agents. Where clusters 
are missing, EU MS institutes should have a more active role. This could be the case, for instance, of 
the Institut français in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, where an EU Delegation is still missing. This last point 
should also be targeted by the Strategy as a shortcoming to be addressed. 
Given the attractiveness of European education, and in line with other experts’ positions, emphasis on 
this area should be reinforced, enhancing in particular the participation of Central Asia’s higher 
education institutions (HEIs) in the framework of Erasmus+9. For instance, at present KIMEP University 
is the only regional educational institute involved in an Erasmus Mundus International Master, that is, 
the ‘Central & East European, Russian & Eurasian Studies’ (CEERES)10.  
Furthermore, a more specific initiative on technical education, focusing among others on oil and gas 
technology and IT sectors could benefit Central Asian students and allow the EU to compete smartly 
                                                            
 
7 EURASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK – CENTRE FOR INTEGRATION STUDIES, EDB Integration Barometer. 2016. Fifth Wave Of The 
Survey, 40, 2016. https://eabr.org/en/analytics/integration-research/cii-reports/integratsionnyy-barometr-eabr-2016/ 
Retrieved on 8 April 2018. For a more precise analysis of EU cultural acceptance in the region, see VALENZA & BOERS, 
Assessing the Effectiveness…, op.cit., 2018. 
8 See COLLINS, N., and BEKENOVA, K., European cultural diplomacy: diaspora relations with Kazakhstan, International Journal 
of Cultural Policy, 23(6), 2017, p. 732-750. 
9 LARUELLE, M., Focusing on higher education and professional training in BOOSTRA, J. (Ed.), Towards a new EU Strategy for 
Central Asia, EUCAM Watch, 18, February 2018. http://www.eucentralasia.eu/uploads/tx_icticontent/EUCAM_Watch_18.pdf 
Retrieved on 4 April 2018. 
10 As a 2-year programme, CEERES offers mobility periods in Partner Universities across Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. 
9 
with Russia’s educational institutions11. Germany and/or Latvia, which have been the most active EU 
MS when it comes to cooperation in Central Asia, should take the lead. 
Finally, a renewed Strategy with a heavy focus on culture should also provide clear indicators against 
which EU policy-makers and relevant stakeholders could review the proposed actions. This should 
include the creation of Brussels-funded Central Asian barometers in cooperation with local survey 
institutes, analysing EU more comprehensive policies in the region, and EU cultural action in 
particular. 
  
                                                            
 
11 LARUELLE, Focusing on higher…, op.cit. 
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